Includes bibliographical references (pages 729-736) and index.
Contents:
Part one. Blind into battle, September 2001-December 2001 -- "Something has happened to Khalid" -- Judgment day -- Friends like these -- Risk management -- Catastrophic success -- Part two. Losing the peace, 2002-2006 -- Small change -- Taliban for Karzai -- The enigma -- "His rules were different than our rules" -- Mr. Big -- Ambassador vs. Ambassador -- Digging a hole in the ocean -- Radicals -- Part thee. The best intentions, 2006-2009 -- Suicide detectives -- Plan Afghanistan -- Murder and the deep state -- Hard data -- Tough love -- Terror and the deep state -- The new big dogs -- Losing Karzai -- A war to give people a chance -- Part four. The end of illusion, 2010-2014 -- The one-man C.I.A. -- The conflict resolution cell -- Kayani 2.0 -- Lives and limbs -- Kayani 3.0 -- Hostages -- Dragon's breath -- Martyrs Day -- Fight and talk -- The Afghan hand -- Homicide Division -- Self-inflicted wounds -- Coups d'état -- Epilogue: Victim impact statements.
Summary:
Traces America's intelligence, military, and diplomatic efforts to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the years since 9/11, and how the U.S. efforts in the Afghan War faltered because of a failure to understand the intentions of Pakistan's intelligence agency.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.