1. Representing games: extensive and normal forms -- Primitive concepts -- The extensive or game tree form of representation -- The normal or matrix form of representation -- Representing games: the 1967 Middle East crisis -- Concluding comments -- 2. Zero-sum games: conflict at the extreme -- Introduction -- Zero-sum games with a saddlepoint -- Zero-sum games without a saddlepoint -- Some problems with mixed strategies -- Concluding comments -- 3. Nonzero-sum games: the rest of the continuum -- Introduction -- A comparison of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games -- An economic policy game -- A watergate game -- A biblical game -- Prisoners' dilemma and the problem of inefficient equilibria -- Paradox lost? -- Concluding comments -- 4. N-person games -- Introduction -- A three-person game: the Geneva Conference of 1954 -- The characteristic function form of representation -- The core -- The von Neumann-Morgenstern V-solution -- The theory of minimal winning coalitions -- The shapley value and the power index -- Concluding comments.
Series:
Sage university papers series. Quantitative applications in the social sciences ; no. 07-041
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