Includes bibliographical references (pages 239-247) and index.
Contents:
The need for ethical naturalism -- Moral problem-solving as an empirical inquiry -- Where are our values bred? : sources of moral norms -- Intuitive processes of moral cognition -- Moral deliberation as cognition, imagination, and feeling -- The nature of "reasonable" moral deliberation -- There is no moral faculty -- Moral fundamentalism is immoral -- The making of a moral self.
Summary:
Argues that appealing solely to absolute principles and values is not only scientifically unsound but even morally suspect, and shows that the standards for the kinds of people we should be and how we should treat one another--which we often think of as universal--are in fact frequently subject to change.
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