pt. 1. Israel's security concept and the intelligence concept -- Israel's security concept and its limitations -- The intelligence concept -- pt. 2. Arab military preparations for war through the intelligence prism -- Basic intelligence -- Formulating the intelligence picture -- The essence of warning -- pt. 3. Intelligence assessments and the decision makers -- Is Egypt starting a war? -- Warning from a particular high placed source -- Assessment of readiness and assessment of intentions -- Meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff -- pt. 4. The mistakes and the failures -- Intelligence's mistaken assessment -- The reasons for the intelligence failure -- pt. 5. The difficulties of intelligence work -- Basic issues in the Intelligence Branch -- Problems with the intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War -- pt. 6. Proposed lessons -- Responsibility for assessment of intentions : the role of the leadership -- Organizational lessons -- Lessons on working methods -- Conclusion -- Appendix A: Israel and the Arab States : important dates between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War -- Appendix B: Intelligence products in the period before the Yom Kippur War -- Appendix C: Emerging lessons in a meeting with the Intelligence Branch director one month after the outbreak of the war -- Appendix D: Personal letter from Intelligence Branch director Major General Aharon Yariv to the author, 27 September 1972 -- Appendix E: Letter in praise of this book by Lieutenant General (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, while serving as chief of general staff.
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