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03689aam a2200541 i 4500 001 31320EC086E611EB80D4A9DB35ECA4DB 003 SILO 005 20210317010020 008 200711t20202020enka b 001 0 eng 010 $a 2020026423 020 $a 1108792472 020 $a 9781108792479 020 $a 1108834892 020 $a 9781108834896 035 $a (OCoLC)1154521930 040 $a LBSOR/DLC $b eng $e rda $c DLC $d OCLCO $d OCLCF $d ERASA $d IND $d YDX $d SILO 042 $a pcc 043 $a fb----- 050 00 $a JQ1879.A15 $b M459 2020 100 1 $a Meng, Anne, $d 1987- $e author. 245 10 $a Constraining dictatorship : $b from personalized rule to institutionalized regimes / $c Anne Meng. 264 1 $a Cambridge, United Kingdom ; $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2020. 300 $a xix, 256 pages : $b illustrations ; $c 23 cm. 490 1 $a Political economy of institutions and decisions 504 $a Includes bibliographical references and index. 505 0 $a Why do leaders institutionalize? -- Two illustrative cases -- How should institutionalization be measured? -- What are the causes of regime institutionalization? -- What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic stability? -- What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession? 520 8 $a How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, this book studies the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. Anne Meng argues that institutions credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites by providing elites with access to the state. She also shows that initially weak leaders who institutionalize are less likely to face coup attempts and are able to remain in office for longer periods than weak leaders who do not. Drawing on an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies, this book ultimately illustrates how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes. 650 0 $a Dictatorship $z Africa, Sub-Saharan. 650 0 $a Public institutions $z Africa, Sub-Saharan. 650 0 $a Personality and politics $z Africa, Sub-Saharan. 650 0 $a Personalism. 650 0 $a Elite (Social sciences) $z Africa, Sub-Saharan. 650 0 $a Power (Social sciences) $z Africa, Sub-Saharan. 651 0 $a Africa, Sub-Saharan $x Politics and government $y 1960- 650 7 $a Dictatorship. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00892878 650 7 $a Elite (Social sciences) $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00908113 650 7 $a Personalism. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01058664 650 7 $a Personality and politics. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01058717 650 7 $a Politics and government. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01919741 650 7 $a Power (Social sciences) $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01074219 650 7 $a Public institutions. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01082505 651 7 $a Sub-Saharan Africa. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01239520 648 7 $a Since 1960 $2 fast 776 08 $i Online version: $a Meng, Anne, 1987- $t Constraining dictatorship $d Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2020 $z 9781108877497 $w (DLC) 2020026424 830 0 $a Political economy of institutions and decisions. 941 $a 1 952 $l OVUX522 $d 20231021021029.0 956 $a http://locator.silo.lib.ia.us/search.cgi?index_0=id&term_0=31320EC086E611EB80D4A9DB35ECA4DBInitiate Another SILO Locator Search