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03741aam a2200505 i 4500 001 25F51936E17011EC82262A731FECA4DB 003 SILO 005 20220601010025 008 210323t20212021caua b 000 0 eng d 020 $a 1977406726 020 $a 9781977406729 035 $a (OCoLC)1242912487 040 $a YDX $b eng $e rda $c YDX $d BDX $d RSM $d OCLCO $d OCLCF $d YDX $d OCLCO $d OCLCQ $d SILO 043 $a e-ur--- $a e-ur--- 050 4 $a JK1994 $b .P67 2021 050 14 $a JK1726 $b .P67 2021 082 04 $a 324.70973 $2 23 100 1 $a Posard, Marek, $e author. 245 10 $a Countering foreign interference in U.S. elections / $c Marek N. Posard, Hilary Reininger, Todd C. Helmus. 264 1 $a Santa Monica, Calif. : $b RAND Corporation, $c [2021] 300 $a xiii, 53 pages : $b color illustrations ; $c 26 cm 500 $a "Sponsored by the California Governor's Office of Emergency services." 504 $a Includes bibliographical references. 505 0 $a Introduction -- Background and Methods -- Focus Groups of Partisans and Independents -- Individual Interviews -- Conclusion and Recommendations -- Appendix A: Focus Group and Interview Guide -- Appendix B: Response Rates for Focus Groups and Interviews -- Appendix C: Relevant Literature. 520 $a This report is the fourth in a four-part series aimed at helping policymakers and the public understand-and mitigate-the threat of online foreign interference in national, state, and local elections. During future U.S. political campaigns, Russia might try again to manipulate and divide U.S. voters via social media. Given the past and likely extant threats to U.S. elections, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services asked for research to help analyze, forecast, and mitigate threats by foreign actors targeting local, state, and national elections. This report first describes research from focus groups and individual interviews on how people respond to memes sourced in Russia that were designed to breed dissension and to a public service announcement (PSA) warning about such online manipulation, then outlines a strategy to counter foreign interference in U.S. elections. The authors posit that adversaries are trying to exploit fault lines that already exist within U.S. society. These efforts could be effectively countered by collecting open-source intelligence on social media; releasing a simple, well-designed PSA for use during election cycles that warns the public about strategic threats targeting U.S. elections; and coordinating with social media companies to flag the source of foreign political content. 650 0 $a Foreign interference in elections $z United States. 650 0 $a Foreign interference in elections $z Russia. 650 0 $a Election security $z United States. 650 0 $a Propaganda, Russian $z United States. 650 0 $a Internet in political campaigns $z United States. 650 0 $a Social media $x Political aspects $z United States. 650 7 $a Election security. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst02021230 650 7 $a Foreign interference in elections. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst02020307 650 7 $a Internet in political campaigns. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00977258 650 7 $a Propaganda, Russian. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01079042 650 7 $a Social media $x Political aspects. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01983657 651 7 $a Russia. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01207312 651 7 $a United States. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01204155 700 1 $a Reininger, Hilary, $e author. 700 1 $a Helmus, Todd C., $e author. 710 2 $a Rand Corporation. $b National Security Research Division, $e issuing body. 941 $a 1 952 $l UNUX074 $d 20220601010616.0 956 $a http://locator.silo.lib.ia.us/search.cgi?index_0=id&term_0=25F51936E17011EC82262A731FECA4DB 994 $a Z0 $b NIUInitiate Another SILO Locator Search