"MG-1033-AUS." Includes bibliographical references (p. 251-254).
Contents:
Ch. One Introduction -- Research Objective -- Research Approach and Considerations -- Organisation of the Monograph -- ch. Two Submarine Design Skills and Processes -- Industry Skills Required to Design Submarines -- Government Skills Required to Manage Submarine Design Efforts -- Design Processes -- Approaches to Submarine Design -- Sequential Design Process -- Sequential Design Phase 1 Concept Design -- Sequential Design Phase 2 Preliminary Design -- Sequential Design Phase 3 Contract Design -- Sequential Design Phase 4 Detail Design -- Continuing Support to Construction -- Sequential Design Pros and Cons -- Concurrent Design Process -- Hybrid Design Process -- Selecting a Design Process -- Roles and Responsibilities -- Government -- Industry -- Other Factors Influencing Design Workload -- Design Skills and Processes: Conclusions -- ch. Three Predictions of Future Demand: Estimates of Manpower Required to Design the Future Submarine -- Point Estimates of Demand: Projections Derived from Experienced Submarine Design Experts -- Range Estimates: Demand Projections Produced by RAND -- RAND Estimate of Overall Industry Level of Effort -- Predictions of Future Demand: Summary -- ch. Four Government Demand: Estimates of Manpower Required to Oversee and Manage the Design of the Future Submarine -- Government Roles and Responsibilities -- Estimating the Demand for Government Personnel -- Required Competencies -- Historical Level of Effort -- Who Can Perform the Government Role? -- Government Demand for Design Skills: Conclusion -- ch. Five Facilities and Tools Required to Design a Modern Submarine -- Facilities and Software Tools -- Category 1, 2, and 3 Tools -- Systems Engineering and Design Management Tools -- ch. Six Measuring Supply: Survey Overview -- Treatment of Missing Data -- Organisation of Industry Survey Responses -- Survey Caveats -- ch. Seven Design Personnel, Facilities, and Software Tools Available in Australian Industry -- Overall Technical Personnel Resource Levels and Submarine Experience -- Future Workforce Demands -- Sources of Revenue -- Current Submarine Workforce -- Previous Workforce Changes -- Estimated Change in Revenues, 2009-2010 -- Ability to Expand the Workforce -- Time Required to Reach Full Proficiency -- Summary Views on Expanding the Workforce -- Summary Estimate of Submarine-Experienced Personnel in Industry to Support a New Design -- Facilities and Software Tools -- Facilities -- Software Tools -- ch. Eight Design Personnel, Facilities, and Software Tools Available Within the Australian Government -- The Roles of Government Organisations -- Personnel Resources -- Ability to Expand the Workforce -- Estimating Future Workforce Demand -- Design Tools and Facilities -- Available Government Resources: Summary -- ch. Nine Design Personnel, Facilities, and Software Tools Available in Australian Academic Institutions -- Technical Expertise -- Facilities and Laboratories -- Institutions with Maritime or Defence Programmes -- Technology Innovation -- Available Academic Resources: Summary -- ch. Ten Specifying Australia's Submarine Design Resources Gap and Defining Options to Close It -- Gap in Personnel Resources -- Industry Personnel -- Government Personnel -- Gap in Skills and Technology -- Options for Closing the Personnel Gaps -- Industry Options -- Government Options -- ch. Eleven Evaluating Options for Closing the Industry-Specific Skilled Design Personnel Gap -- RAND's Past Analyses of Gaps -- RAND's Technical-Workforce Simulation Model -- Modifying the Model for Australian Circumstances -- What the Model Can Produce: Required Versus Accomplished Workload -- Model Assumptions -- Forecasting the Future Submarine Programme Workload: How Large a Skilled Design Workforce Will Australia Need? -- The Future Submarine Will Require More Work Hours Than the Anticipated Available Skilled Workforce Can Provide -- The 15-Year Design Schedule Will Encounter Schedule Delays, Based on Anticipated Skilled Workforce Availability -- The 20-Year Design Schedule Will Encounter Fewer Schedule Delays Than the 15-Year Schedule, Based on Anticipated Skilled Workforce Availabilities -- Quantitative Conclusion: Industry Skilled Workforce Will Fall Far Short of Programme Demand -- Summary Observations: Evaluating Options Available to Industry -- Option 1 Build from Within Australia -- Option 2 Infuse International Experienced Personnel -- ch. Twelve Evaluating Options for Closing the Government-Specific Personnel Gap -- Option 1 Draw Personnel from the Collins Class or Other Maritime Programmes -- Option 2 Hire New Personnel -- Option 3 Draw Core Personnel from the Collins Class to Start the Programme, Then Grow New Personnel -- Choosing Amongst the Government Options -- ch. Thirteen Evaluating Options for Closing Skill Gaps That Exist Across Industry, Government, and Academia -- Combat System Gap -- Hull Form Design Gap -- Internal HM&E Systems Gap -- ch. Fourteen Conclusions and Policy Considerations -- Closing the Gap in Industry -- Industry Option 1 Hire and Train Personnel from Within Australia -- Industry Option 2 Infuse Submarine-Experienced Personnel from Outside Australia -- Preferred Approach: A Mixture of Option 1 and Option 2 -- Closing the Gap in Government -- Closing the Skill Gaps Existing Across Industry, Government, and Academia -- Policy Considerations -- APPENDICES -- A.Operational Safety Considerations -- B.Workload Profiles by Skill -- C.Implementing the Integrated Product and Process Development Approach -- D.Submarine Design Tools -- E.Domestic Submarine Design Capability Survey.
Summary:
"In the mid-2020s, the Royal Australian Navy plans to retire the oldest of its Collins-class submarines. Australia intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace the Collins-class vessels. The Australian Department of Defence asked RAND to assess the domestic engineering and design skills that industry and the government will need to design the vessels, the skills that they currently possess, and ways to fill any gaps between the two. Although Australian industry has numerous technical draftsmen and engineers, few have experience in submarine design, and their availability may be limited due to demands on their time from other programs. The researchers concluded that (1) using this inexperienced domestic workforce instead of a fully experienced one to design the new submarine would lengthen the time it would take to complete the design by three to four years and would increase the costs by about 20 percent, (2) adding submarine-experienced personnel from abroad would shorten the schedule and lessen the cost increase, and (3) taking 20 years rather than 15 years to design the submarine would reduce the peak demand for designers and draftsmen." --From publisher description.
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