A surprise out of Zion? : case studies in Israel's decisions on whether to alert the United States to preemptive and preventive strikes, from Suez to the Syrian nuclear reactor / Warren Bass.
"National Security Research Division." "RR-498-ARA"--Cover page 4. Includes bibliographical references (pages 75-78).
Contents:
Introduction -- Case I: The Suez War, 1956 -- Case II: The Six-Day War, 1967 -- Case III: The Raid on Osiraq, 1981 -- Case IV: The Raid on al-Kibar, 2007 -- Conclusion.
Summary:
"Might U.S. officials be surprised by an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities? This study examines some key historical precedents, considering four key cases in which Israeli prime ministers chose preemptive or preventive military strikes and had to decide whether to notify or consult with the United States: the Suez crisis of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, the 1981 strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor, and the 2007 bombing of the mysterious Syrian nuclear facility known as al-Kibar. The Eisenhower and Reagan administrations were indeed surprised by Israel's actions in 1956 and 1981, but U.S.-Israel relations were put under far less strain by the bilateral discussions that preceded Israeli military action in 1967 and 2007. With the widening and deepening of the U.S.-Israel special relationship over the decades, Israeli prime ministers will have to think very carefully before choosing confrontation over consultation with the United States."--Back cover.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.