Includes bibliographical references (pages 221-240) and index.
Contents:
The signaling trap -- How elections work in Vietnam -- "Unconditional party government" : legislative organization in the VNA -- Explaining the evolution of the VNA -- Mobilized or motivated? -- Explaining oversight behavior -- Intimidation or legitimation?
Summary:
"Conventional wisdom emerging from China and other autocracies claims that single-party legislatures and elections are mutually beneficial for citizens and autocrats. This line of thought reasons that these institutions can serve multiple functions, like constraining political leaders or providing information about citizens. In "United Front," Paul Schuler challenges these views through his examination of the past and present functioning of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA), arguing that the legislature's primary role is to signal strength to the public. When active, the critical behavior from delegates in the legislature represents crossfire within the regime rather than genuine citizen feedback. In making these arguments, Schuler counters a growing scholarly trend to see democratic institutions within single-party settings like China and Vietnam as useful for citizens or regime performance. His argument also suggests that there are limits to generating genuinely "consultative authoritarianism" through quasidemocratic institutions. Applying a diverse range of cutting edge social science methods on a wealth of original data such as legislative speeches, election returns, and surveys, Schuler shows that even in a seemingly vociferous legislature like the VNA, the ultimate purpose of the institution is to signal the regime's preferences while taking down rivals; not to reflect the views of citizens"-- Provided by publisher.
Series:
Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.