Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-216) and index.
Contents:
Introduction: Rethinking the Kantian Reflective Ideal -- Part I. Reflection : 1. Kant on the Requirement to Reflect -- 2. Healthy Human Understanding -- 3. Attention, Perception, Experience -- Part II. Virtue : 4. Conceptions of Reason and Epistemic Normativity -- 5. Cognitive and Moral Virtue -- 6. Virtue as a Skill -- 7. The Cognitive Basic of Moral Virtue.
Summary:
There can be no doubt that Kant thought we should be reflective: we ought to care to make up our own minds about how things are and what is worth doing. Philosophical objections to the Kantian reflective ideal have centered on concerns about the excessive control that the reflective person is supposed to exert over her own mental life, and Kantians who feel the force of these objections have recently drawn attention to Kant's conception of moral virtue as it is developed in his later work, chiefly the Metaphysics of Morals. Melissa Merritt's book is a distinctive contribution to this recent turn to virtue in Kant scholarship. Merritt argues that we need a clearer and textually more comprehensive account of what reflection is in order not only to understand Kant's account of virtue, but also to appreciate how it effectively rebuts longstanding objections to the Kantian reflective ideal--back cover.
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