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03825aam a2200505 i 4500 001 DA4D21A6AE9011EDA0B1416654ECA4DB 003 SILO 005 20230217010059 008 220404t20222022ilua b 001 0 eng 010 $a 2022016001 020 $a 022682215X 020 $a 9780226822150 020 $a 0226822133 020 $a 9780226822136 035 $a (OCoLC)1304362875 040 $a ICU/DLC $b eng $e rda $c DLC $d OCLCF $d UKMGB $d TOH $d CDX $d YDX $d SILO 042 $a pcc 050 00 $a KZ6250 $b .P469 2022 100 1 $a Peritz, Lauren J., $e author. 245 10 $a Delivering on promises : $b the domestic politics of compliance in international courts / $c Lauren J. Peritz. 246 30 $a Domestic politics of compliance in international courts 264 1 $a Chicago ; $b The University of Chicago Press, $c 2022. 300 $a 353 pages : $b illustrations (black and white) ; $c 24 cm. 490 1 $a Chicago series on international and domestic institutions 504 $a Includes bibliographical references (pages 313-337) and index. 505 0 $a International adjudication, stakeholders, and domestic divisions -- A theory of international courts, compliance, and domestic veto players -- The design and operation of two international courts -- Policy compliance in WTO disputes -- Trade cooperation in WTO disputes -- The ECI and domestic constraints on the single market -- Reshaping international economic courts. 520 $a "When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Despite their formal independence from international authority, states have created rules of behavior, particularly governing international economic relations, and international tribunals that are empowered to enforce them. Just how effective are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results-but they are only effective under certain conditions. States are more likely to fail to comply with international rules and decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to effectively oppose compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates her argument with an extensive empirical analysis tracing the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) which focuses on trade disputes within the EU. At a time when international agreements and cooperation have come under attack by politicians such as Donald Trump and others, this is a timely investigation into the conditions that make international agreements and the institutions enforcing them vulnerable"-- $c Provided by publisher. 610 20 $a World Trade Organization. 610 20 $a Court of Justice of the European Union. 650 0 $a International courts. 650 0 $a International courts $x Political aspects. 650 0 $a International courts $v Case studies. 650 0 $a International economic relations $x Political aspects. 650 0 $a International cooperation. 650 7 $a LAW / International. $2 bisacsh 610 27 $a Court of Justice of the European Union. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01912864 610 27 $a World Trade Organization. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00697669 650 7 $a International cooperation. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00976857 650 7 $a International courts. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00976874 650 7 $a International economic relations $x Political aspects. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00976908 655 7 $a Case studies. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01423765 830 0 $a Chicago series on international and domestic institutions. 941 $a 1 952 $l OVUX522 $d 20240717014435.0 956 $a http://locator.silo.lib.ia.us/search.cgi?index_0=id&term_0=DA4D21A6AE9011EDA0B1416654ECA4DBInitiate Another SILO Locator Search