Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-243) and index.
Contents:
10.7. Concluding Remarks. 1.1. Three Paradoxes -- 1.2. Ramsey's Division -- 1.3. Universality -- 1.4. Plan of This Book -- 2. Paradox and Context -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Repetition, Rehabilitation, Iteration -- 2.3. Context-change and Discourse Analysis -- 2.4. Context-change and Repetition -- 2.5. Action of Context on Content -- 2.6. Reflective Status as a Contextual Coordinate -- 2.7. Four Tests for Context-sensitivity -- 2.8. Simple Russell -- 2.9. Simple Liar -- 3. Singularities -- 3.1. Minimality and Singularities -- 3.2. Reflective Status -- 3.3. More on Singularities -- 4. Identifying Singularities -- 4.1. Primary Trees -- 4.2. Singularities and Semantic Universality -- 4.3. Comparisons -- 5. Paradoxes of Definability, Russell's Paradox, the Liar -- 5.1. Paradoxes of Definability -- 5.1.1. Richard's Paradox -- 5.1.2. Berry and Konig -- 5.2. Russell's Paradox -- 5.2.1. Sets and Classes -- 5.2.2. Extensions -- 5.2.3. Extensions and Paradox -- 5.3. Liar Paradox -- 5.3.1. Strengthened Liar -- 5.3.2. More Liars -- 6. General Theory of Singularities -- 6.1. Preliminaries -- 6.1.1. Explicitly Reflective Contexts -- 6.1.2. Determination Sets and Values -- 6.2. Basic Notions -- 6.3. 0-expressions -- 6.4. Reflective Hierarchy -- 6.5. Reflection-free Expressions and Singularities -- 6.6. Higher Levels of the Reflective Hierarchy -- 6.7. Summary -- 7. Theory at Work -- 7.1. Transfinite Paradox of Denotation -- 7.2. Truth-Teller, a Curry Sentence, Loops -- 7.2.1. Truth-Teller and the Curry Paradox -- 7.2.2. Loops -- 7.3. New Paradoxes without Circularity -- 7.3.1. Definability Paradox without Circularity -- 7.3.2. Russell without Circularity -- 7.3.3. Truth Paradoxes without Circularity -- 8. Revenge, I -- 8.1. Forms of Revenge -- 8.2. Kripke's Theory of Truth -- 8.3. Fields Theory of Truth -- 8.3.1. Kripke and Non-classical Logic -- 8.3.2. Fields Theory of Truth -- 8.3.3. Field's Conditional -- 8.3.4. Determinate Truth -- 8.3.5. Field's Theory and Natural Language -- 8.4. Dialetheism and Revenge -- 9. Revenge, II -- 9.1. Contextual Theories and Direct Revenge -- 9.2. Contextual Theories and Second-order Revenge -- 9.3. Singularity Theory and Revenge -- 9.4. Summary -- 10. Consequences for Deflationism -- 10.1. Deflationary Truth -- 10.2. Deflationism Extended -- 10.3. Deflationism and Semantic Paradox -- 10.4. Three Deflationist Responses -- 10.4.1. Pathology as Meaningless? -- 10.4.2. Unrestricted Truth Schema? -- 10.4.3. Restricted Truth Schema? -- 10.5. Expressive Role of Truth -- 10.6. Prosentential Theory and Horwich's Minimalism -- 10.6.1. Prosentential Theory -- 10.6.2. Horwich's Minimalism -- 10.7. Concluding Remarks.
Summary:
Keith Simmons presents an original, unified solution to the semantic paradoxes which have dogged attempts to give a consistent account of the logic of natural language since antiquity: the Liar paradox and the paradoxes of reference and predication.
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