Economic models of law / edited by Thomas J. Miceli, Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut, USA and Matthew J. Baker, Associate Professor of Economics, Hunter College, City University of New York, USA.
LCCN 2013946838 was printed in book in error. That LCCN had been assigned to a similiar title (Research handbook on economic models of law) also published by Elgar. Includes bibliographical references. Introduction Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker PART I GENERAL 1. Robert Cooter (1985), 'Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution' 2. Donald Wittman (1981), 'Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law' PART II TORTS 3. A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson (1983), 'Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power' 4. Steven Shavell (1984), 'A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation' 5. Keith N. Hylton (1990), 'The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence' 6. Kathryn E. Spier (2011), 'Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn' PART III CONTRACTS 7. Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1985), 'Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard' 8. Steven Shavell (1994), 'Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale' 9. Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), 'Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments' PART IV PROPERTY 10. Dean Lueck (1995), 'The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law' 11. Mathew J. Baker (2003), 'An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies' 12. Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), 'Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis' 13. Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1984), 'The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?' 14. Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson (1994), 'Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?' 15. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1989), 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law' 16. Paul Klemperer (1990), 'How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?' PART V CRIME 17. Gary Becker (1968), 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' 18. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), 'The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law' 19. William J. Furlong (1987), 'A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention' PART VI LEGAL PROCESS 20. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1988), 'Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion' 21. Barry Nalebluff (1987), 'Credible Pretrial Negotiation' 22. Avery Katz (1990), 'The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of Legal Disputes'
Series:
Economic approaches to law ; 44 An Elgar research collection
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