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05571aam a2200565Ii 4500 001 A810C2F4840811E89478B85797128E48 003 SILO 005 20180710010618 008 161222t20172017dcua b 100 0 eng d 020 $a 030945168X 020 $a 9780309451680 035 $a (OCoLC)966564344 040 $a YDX $b eng $e rda $c YDX $d IXA $d KSU $d SOI $d SILO 043 $a n-us--- 050 4 $a JZ5865.B56 $b E54 2016 111 2 $a Enhancing BioWatch Capabilities Through Technology and Collaboration (Workshop) $d (2016 : $c Washington, D.C.), $j author. 245 00 $a Enhancing BioWatch Capabilities Through Technology and Collaboration : $b proceedings of a workshop / $c Joe Alper, rapporteur ; Standing Committee on Health Threats and Workforce Resilience, Board on Health Sciences Policy, Health and Medicine Division, The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 264 1 $a Washington, DC : $b The National Academies Press, $c [2017] 300 $a xiv, 96 pages : $b illustrations ; $c 23 cm 500 $a "Enhancing BioWatch Capabilities Through Technology and Collaboration: a Workshop, July 27-28, 2016, Keck Center of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Room 100, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001"--Page 77. 520 $a "The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) BioWatch program aims to provide an early indication of an aerosolized biological weapon attack. The first generation of BioWatch air samplers were deployed in 2003. The current version of this technology, referred to as Generation 2 (Gen-2), uses daily manual collection and testing of air filters from each monitor, a process that can take 12 to 36 hours to detect the presence of biological pathogens. Until April 2014, DHS pursued a next-generation autonomous detection technology that aimed to shorten the time from sample collection to detection to less than 6 hours, reduce the cost of analysis, and increase the number of detectable biological pathogens. Because of concerns about the cost and effectiveness of the proposed Generation 3 system (Gen-3), DHS cancelled its acquisition plans for the next-generation surveillance system. In response to the cancellation announcement, Congress asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a review of the program and the proposed system enhancements that would have been incorporated in BioWatch Gen-3. However, Mike Walter, BioWatch Program manager, Office of Health Affairs, DHS, said that DHS did not agree with all of GAO's characterizations of the BioWatch program efforts described in this review. In response to this, DHS requested that the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine conduct a workshop to further explore the findings of the 2015 GAO report and discuss the impact these findings may have with regard to the future development of the technical capabilities of the BioWatch program. Workshop participants also discussed existing and possible collaborations between BioWatch, public health laboratories, and other stakeholders that could contribute to the enhancement of biosurveillance capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop"--Publisher's description 504 $a Includes bibliographical references. 505 0 $a An overview of BioWatch strategic priorities -- Recommendations from the Government Accountability Office Report and the Department of Homeland Security Response -- BioWatch collaborative planning -- Future opportunities for state and local collaboration -- Reflections on the workshop. 610 20 $a BioWatch Program (U.S.) $v Congresses. 650 0 $a Biological weapons $x Defense measures $z United States $v Congresses. 650 0 $a Biosecurity $z United States $v Congresses. 650 0 $a Bioterrorism $z United States $v Congresses. 650 0 $a Bioterrorism $z United States $x Congresses. $x Congresses. 650 0 $a Medical technology $x Research $z United States $v Congresses. 650 0 $a Biological warfare $x Congresses. $x Congresses. 650 0 $a Biological warfare $z United States $x Congresses. $x Congresses. 650 0 $a Biological warfare $z United States $x Congresses. $x Congresses. 650 0 $a Public health surveillance $z United States $x Congresses. 650 12 $a Bioterrorism $x prevention & control. $0 (DNLM)D023482Q000517 650 12 $a Biohazard Release $x prevention & control. $0 (DNLM)D055885Q000517 650 22 $a Biosurveillance. $0 (DNLM)D055877 650 22 $a Biological Warfare Agents. $0 (DNLM)D054045 650 22 $a Environmental Monitoring $x methods. $0 (DNLM)D004784Q000379 650 2 $a Bioterrorism. $0 (DNLM)D023482 650 2 $a Biohazard Release. $0 (DNLM)D055885 650 2 $a Environmental Monitoring. $0 (DNLM)D004784 651 2 $a United States. $0 (DNLM)D014481 700 1 $a Alper, Joe, $e rapporteur. 710 2 $a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (U.S.). $b Standing Committee on Health Threats and Workforce Resilience, $e issuing body. 710 2 $a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (U.S.). $b Board on Health Sciences Policy. 710 2 $a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (U.S.). $b Health and Medicine Division. 776 08 $i Print version: $t Enhancing BioWatch capabilities through technology and collaboration. $d Washington, DC : National Academies Press, [2017] $w (OCoLC)993708108 941 $a 1 952 $l OVUX522 $d 20191213012949.0 956 $a http://locator.silo.lib.ia.us/search.cgi?index_0=id&term_0=A810C2F4840811E89478B85797128E48Initiate Another SILO Locator Search