Includes bibliographical references (pages 313-337) and index.
Contents:
International adjudication, stakeholders, and domestic divisions -- A theory of international courts, compliance, and domestic veto players -- The design and operation of two international courts -- Policy compliance in WTO disputes -- Trade cooperation in WTO disputes -- The ECI and domestic constraints on the single market -- Reshaping international economic courts.
Summary:
"When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Despite their formal independence from international authority, states have created rules of behavior, particularly governing international economic relations, and international tribunals that are empowered to enforce them. Just how effective are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results-but they are only effective under certain conditions. States are more likely to fail to comply with international rules and decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to effectively oppose compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates her argument with an extensive empirical analysis tracing the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) which focuses on trade disputes within the EU. At a time when international agreements and cooperation have come under attack by politicians such as Donald Trump and others, this is a timely investigation into the conditions that make international agreements and the institutions enforcing them vulnerable"-- Provided by publisher.
Series:
Chicago series on international and domestic institutions
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.