Includes bibliographical references (pages 265-292) and index.
Contents:
Acknowledgments. Introduction : Chemical weapons in Syria, 2012-13 -- Credibility and international politics: the case for reputations -- Credibility and international politics: the case against reputations -- Coercive outcome in Syria -- Syria as a deterrence/compellence "success"? -- Postscript -- Outline and objectives. 1 Reputations research and premature closure of inquiry : The Press-Mercer-Hopf Consensus -- Hopf (1994) "peripheral visions" -- Press (2005) "calculating credibility" -- Mercer (1996) "reputation and international politics" -- Premature closure of inquiry: an illustration -- Application of P-M-H Consensus excludes important research on international reputations -- The missing scholarship. 2 Reputations matter: rational deterrence theory and credibility reconsidered : Four core prerequisites of credible coercive threats -- RDT and necessity and sufficiency -- Reassessing Fearon -- Reputations and imperfect information -- Similarity and transferability of reputations and credibility -- Reputations and miscalculations -- General versus specific reputations -- Reputations, credibility, and transferability are in the eyes of the beholder -- Conclusion. 3 US reputation building in deterrence encounters, 1991-2003 : Case 1: Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-5) -- Case 2: Kosovo (1998-9) -- Case 3: Iraq (1991-2003) -- Conclusion. 4 The strategic logic of US coercion: explaining deterrence failures and successes in Syria, 2011-13 : Defining success in Syria -- Syria: RDT versus P-M-H -- US reputations and past actions -- Escalation and mission creep -- Protracted crises, probes, and tipping points -- Assad's miscalculations -- Credibility paradox: punishments and promises -- Summary and conclusions -- Extremes are wrong -- Relevant reputations (and credibility) are in the eyes of the beholder -- Similarities, differences, and relevant cases. 5 RDT, domestic politics, and audience costs : Domestic politics, US credibility, and the eyes of the beholder -- Domestic politics, past actions, and reputations. 6 Reputations, credibility, and transferability: reconsidering Syria's relevance to Iran, North Korea, and beyond : Why transferability matters -- Complex credibility and transferability -- Complex credibility in Syria -- Iran, transferability, and the credibility paradox revisited. 7 Responding to critics: alternative explanations and competing policy recommendations : Alternative explanations for the Syria Disarmament Deal -- The real costs of bluffing in Syria -- P-M-H consensus: reputations are irrelevant, so bluffing is costless -- bluffing and bad poker analogies: what the critics miss -- Why bluffing matters -- When bluffing matters -- Why bluffing in international politics is not like poker -- Unintended consequences of congressionally endorsed bluffing. 8 Expanding theory-policy gaps in international relations : Theory-policy gap(s) and confirmation bias(es) -- Theory-policy gaps and confirmation bias: the case of post-Iraq intelligence reform -- Theory-policy gaps and confirmation bias: the case of coercive diplomacy in Syria, 2013 -- Richard Price on Syria -- Jonathan Mercer on Syria -- Stephen Walt on Syria -- Establishing continuity in US foreign policy -- From policy to theory: the "MIT school" and Syria. References -- Index.
Summary:
"When Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people in Syria, he clearly crossed President Barack Obama's "red line." At the time, many argued that the president had to bomb in order to protect America's reputation for toughness, and therefore its credibility, abroad; others countered that concerns regarding reputation were overblown, and that reputations are irrelevant for coercive diplomacy. Whether international reputations matter is the question at the heart of Fighting for Credibility. For skeptics, past actions and reputations have no bearing on an adversary's assessment of credibility; power and interests alone determine whether a threat is believed. Using a nuanced and sophisticated theory of rational deterrence, Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton argue the opposite: ignoring reputations sidesteps important factors about how adversaries perceive threats. Focusing on cases of asymmetric US encounters with smaller powers since the end of the Cold War including Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria, Harvey and Mitton reveal that reputations matter for credibility in international politics. This dynamic and deeply documented study successfully brings reputation back to the table of foreign diplomacy."-- Provided by publisher.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.