Foreword: "three colonels" / by Stanley Weintraub -- The maximum "bloodletting and delay" -- Spinning the casualties -- The First Army and Kwantung redeployments -- The Pacific build-up and Berlin decision -- "Not a recipe for victory " -- The decision -- Japanese defense plans -- "Victory might be salvaged" -- The "manpower box" -- Mistakes and misperceptions -- What is defeat? -- The amphibious operation -- On the ground -- Unexamined factors -- A "target-rich environment" -- Half a million Purple Hearts -- "Punishment from heaven" -- Afterword -- Appendix A: G-2 estimate of enemy situation on Kyushu, U.S. Sixth Army, August 1, 1945 -- Appendix B: G-2 analysis of Japanese plans for the defense of Kyushu, U.S. Sixth Army, December 31, 1945 -- Appendix C: proclamation defining terms for Japanese surrender issued at Potsdam, July 26, 1945 (Potsdam Declaration) -- Appendix D: extract from a letter written by James Michener, October 20, 1995.
Summary:
A comprehensive and compelling examination of the many complex issues that comprised the strategic plans for the American invasion of Japan, this groundbreaking history counters the revisionist interpretations that question President Truman's rationale for using the atom bomb.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.