Nim and combinatoral games -- Congestion games -- Games in strategic form -- Games trees with perfect information -- Expected Utility -- Mixed equilibrium -- Brouwer's fix-point theorem -- Zero-sum games -- Geometry of equilibria in bimatrix games -- Game trees with imperfect information -- Bargaining -- Correlated equilibrium.
Summary:
"This book is an introduction to the mathematics of non-cooperative game theory. Each concept is explained in detail, starting from a main example, with a slowpaced proof of each theorem. The book has been designed and tested for self-study, and as an undergraduate course text with core chapters and optional chapters for different audiences. It has been developed over 15 years for a one-semester course on game theory at the London School of Economics and the distance learning program of the University of London, attended each year by about 200 third-year students in mathematics, economics, management, and other degrees. After studying this book, a student who started from first-year mathematics (the basics of linear algebra, analysis, and probability) will have a solid understanding of the most important concepts and theorems of non-cooperative game theory"-- Provided by publisher.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.