Includes bibliographical references (pages 207-265) and index.
Contents:
Liddell Hart and limiting risk -- Winners: Britain, Wellington, the Arab Revolt, and Operation Torch -- Losers and a tie: the Sicilian Expedition, the Imjin War, Bonaparte, Gallipoli, and the Norwegian Campaign -- The rationale for a second front and indirectness -- Reasons for success or failure -- Limited wars with limited aims and means -- Descent into disaster -- An idea whose time has gone -- A new paradigm for success.
Summary:
"The United States has the most expensive and seemingly unstoppable military in the world. Yet, since World War II the nation's military success rate has been meager. The Korean War was a draw, while Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan, and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. What differentiates the failures from the successes? Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops. Phillip S. Meilinger's new book advocates strategies that limit risks in war as well as achieve measurable goals. Instead of large numbers of conventional ground troops, the author argues in favor of a focus on asymmetric capabilities--a combination of airpower, special operation forces, intelligence, and indigenous ground troops--to achieve the desired political outcomes."--Provided by publisher.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.