Globalism and regionalism : the East Asian currency crisis and institutional building / Motoshi Suzuki. Part IV : Currency cooperation -- Signaling game of collective self-defense in the U. S. - Japan alliance / Shuhei Kurizaki -- Information sharing in early stage international disputes : how China and Japan communicate / Shoko Kohama ; Atsushi Tago ; Kazunori Inamasu -- Peacekeeping by the UN and regional organizations : sharing the burden or passing the buck? / Yukari Iwanami -- Part II : Security cooperation and arms control -- Politics over the claim of individual self-defense at wars : aid conditionality and reciprocity in Asian regional conflict / Atsushi Tago -- International cooperation and institution formation : a game of theoretic perspective / Akira Okada -- An agenda-setting game of the Landmine Ban Treaty / Hikaru Hayashi -- Part III : Trade cooperation -- FTA/EPA negotiations and domestic reforms in two-level games analysis / Kaoru Ishiguro -- The paradox of compliance : does legalization increase compliance in trade disputes? / Keisuke Iida -- Part IV : Currency cooperation -- Analyzing international development loan markets with rival lenders / Motoshi Suzuki ; Keisuke Iida ; Shohei Doi -- Globalism and regionalism : the East Asian currency crisis and institutional building / Motoshi Suzuki.
Summary:
This edited volume is an outcome of the first major collaborative project between Japanese economists and political scientists, funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. The authors of the individual chapters show that Asian states play games of conflict and cooperation strategically by creating, changing, or destroying institutions. For them, conflict and cooperation are inseparable phenomena and are integral parts of states' strategic interactions under constraints. Through the establishment of appropriate institutions that coordinate states' actions, present conflict can be turned into stable cooperation in the future. No discernible difference exists in the extent of rationality between the East and the West, but substantial variations between regions or even within a region are found in institutions that are influenced by history and culture. Historical and cultural variations divide contemporary Asia, making regional institutional cooperation difficult and prompting some Asian states to use global or inter-regional arrangements in order to obtain benefits of cooperation. Qualifications are provided for this line of argument in the first chapter, which also discusses the affinity of international relations theory and game theory, with special attention to Japan and Asia. The following ten substantive chapters are developed based on the conceptual framework and, for integrity and coherence, are sub-grouped into four parts that correspond to major issues in international relations scholarship: (1) conflict management, (2) arms control, (3) trade, and (4) currency.
Series:
Political economy of the Asia Pacific 1866-6515. 1866-6515.
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