Includes bibliographical references (pages 263-312) and index.
Contents:
The Balfour lens -- From deferral to denial -- Missed opportunities -- Abnormal normalization -- The Oslo trade-off -- The price of failure -- Less of the same -- The end of the peace process.
Summary:
The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. Two irreducible factors stand in the way: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. American peacemaking efforts have been hobbled by the U.S. assumption that a credible peace settlement could be achieved without addressing Israel's vast superiority in power or internal Palestinian politics. While there is no denying the roles played by Israelis and Palestinians in perpetuating their conflict, Washington's distinctive "blind spot" to Palestinian politics and Israeli power has prevented it from serving as an effective peace broker. Shaped by the pressures American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, the blind spot also has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate over Palestine. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present. Unless and until U.S. policymakers are prepared to act in ways that constrain Israeli power and acknowledge Palestinian politics, American peacemaking stands little chance of success.-- Amazon.
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