Includes bibliographical references (pages 233-246) and index.
Contents:
Part 1. The advantages of nuclear advantages -- Toward a new theory of nuclear deterrence: -- The superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory -- Nuclear war outcomes -- The correlates of nuclear crisis outcomes -- The mechanisms of nuclear crisis outcomes -- Nuclear deterrence and compellence -- Part 2. The disadvantages of nuclear advantages? -- Strategic stability -- Arms races -- Nonproliferation -- The defense budget -- Conclusion.
Summary:
"What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to a longstanding, academic conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state's national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state's expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the longest-standing and most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing nuclear dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump recently declared, a nuclear arsenal "at the top of the pack.""--Provided by publisher.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.