List of Figures -- List of tables -- Preface and acknowledgements -- Understanding donor pursuit of foreign aid effectiveness -- How national structures shape foreign aid delivery: a theory -- Examining the causal mechanism across donors: the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden,Germany, and France -- Country-level evidence linking donor political economies to variation in aid delivery -- Testing the argument with evidence from aid officials from the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden,Germany, France, and Japan -- Examining public opinion as an alternative explanation: evidence from survey experiments with voters in the United States and Germany -- Implications for aid effectiveness, public policy, and future research.
Summary:
"The motivation behind this book stems from a memorable incident that took place in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hercegovina, in 2003. At the time, I was working for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on projects related to development and peace-building. One such project entailed a collaboration with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the international institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement ending the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. At the urging of the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, representatives of international financial organisations, the United States government, and local business elite launched a public-private partnership to reduce and remove laws and regulations perceived as barriers to private investment and job creation. The OHR figuratively embraced the interventionist nature of the project by naming it the 'Bulldozer Initiative' and setting the task of having '50 reforms enacted within 150 days'. For years, economic development of this kind was elusive and for good reasons: these efforts took place in a highly complex, post-conflict environment, presided over by foreign administrators, where politics remained deeply divided along ethnic lines and hope for a functioning and prosperous multi-ethnic state was a rare commodity"-- Provided by publisher. "Why do some donor governments pursue international development through recipient governments, while others bypass such local authorities? Weaving together scholarship in political economy, public administration and historical institutionalism, Simone Dietrich argues that the bureaucratic institutions of donor countries shape donor-recipient interactions differently despite similar international and recipient country conditions. Donor nations employ institutional constraints that authorize, enable and justify particular aid delivery tactics while precluding others. Offering quantitative and qualitative analyses of donor decision-making, the book illuminates how donors with neoliberally organized public sectors bypass recipient governments, while donors with more traditional public-sector-oriented institutions cooperate and engage recipient authorities on aid delivery. The book demonstrates how internal beliefs and practices about states and markets inform how donors see and set their objectives for foreign aid and international development itself. It informs debates about aid effectiveness and donor coordination and carries implications for the study of foreign policy, more broadly." -- Provided by publisher.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.