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Author:
Radcliffe, Elizabeth Schmidt, 1955- author.
Title:
Hume, passion, and action / Elizabeth S. Radcliffe.
Edition:
First edition.
Publisher:
Oxford University Press,
Copyright Date:
2018
Description:
x, 230 pages ; 25 cm.
Subject:
Hume, David,--1711-1776.
Hume, David,--1711-1776.
Emotions.
Act (Philosophy)
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references (pages [215]-224) and index.
Contents:
Machine generated contents note: A.2. Eighteenth-Century Theories of Passion, Reason, and Action. 0.2. Sketch of Hume's Characterization of Reason and Passion -- 0.3. Method of Interpretation and Preview of the Arguments -- 1. Motives to Action -- 1.1. Motives and Reasons: Some Clarifications -- 1.2. Overview of Hume's Characterization of the Passions -- 1.3. Which Passions Are Motives? -- 1.4. Summary -- 2. Hume's Argument for the Inertness of Reason -- 2.1. What Is the Target of Hume's Argument? -- 2.2. "Reason Alone Can Never Be a Motive" -- 2.3. Does Hume's Argument Allow that Beliefs Motivate Even If Reason Does Not? -- 2.4. Interpretation that Beliefs Alone Are Not Motives -- 3. Belief: Some Complications -- 3.1. Hume's Characterization of Ideas -- 3.2. Hume's Characterization of Belief -- 3.3. Is the "Direction-of-Fit" Argument Derived from Hume? -- 3.4. Objects of Belief and Objects of Reason -- 4. Passions as Original Existences -- 4.1. Reason Generates No Impulses or Attractions -- 4.2. Features of Original Existences -- 4.3. Defense of Hume's Conception of the Passions -- 4.4. "Unreasonable" and "Reasonable" Motivating Passions -- 4.5. Has Hume Effectively Countered the Rationalists? -- 5. Morality and Motivation -- 5.1. Hume's Motivation Argument -- 5.2. Moral Internalisms -- 5.3. Natural-Motive Interpretation -- 5.4. Moral-Discernment Interpretation -- 5.5. Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Cognitivism -- 6. Motivational Dynamics and Regulation of the Passions -- 6.1. Strength versus Violence -- 6.2. Natural Influences on the Passions -- 6.3. How Others' Passions Affect Us: Sympathy and Comparison -- 6.4. Strength of Mind -- 6.5. Moderating the Passions with the Passions -- 6.6. Limits to Self-Regulation of the Passions -- 6.7. Practical Role of Strength of Conviction -- 7. Conclusion: The Passions in Hume's Project -- 7.1. Understanding, the Passions, and Morals as a System -- 7.2. Passions in Relation to Tragedy and Religion -- 7.3. Passions as an Antidote to Religious Moralizing -- 7.4. Signature Role of the Passions -- Appendix: The Passions and Reason in Seventeenth-and Eighteenth-Century Philosophy -- A.1. Seventeenth-Century Theories of Passion, Reason, and Action -- A.2. Eighteenth-Century Theories of Passion, Reason, and Action.
Summary:
"David Hume's theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe defends an original interpretation of Hume's views on passion, reason, and motivation which is consistent with other theses in Hume's philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. She challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to "Humeans" than many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume's response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume's thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume's sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as "original existences" having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists."-- Publisher's website.
ISBN:
9780199573295
0199573298
OCLC:
(OCoLC)1013970534
Locations:
OVUX522 -- University of Iowa Libraries (Iowa City)

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