The Locator -- [(subject = "Analysis Philosophy")]

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001 9A025B3C1E3F11EAA58222FC96128E48
003 SILO
005 20191214010106
008 181101t20192019enk      b    001 0 eng d
020    $a 9780199228645
020    $a 0199228647
035    $a (OCoLC)1059554010
040    $a YDX $b eng $e rda $c YDX $d OCLCQ $d BDX $d UKMGB $d ERASA $d YDXIT $d OCLCF $d UtOrBLW $d SILO
050  4 $a BC199.M6 $b S45 2019 $0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/classification/BC1-BC199
082 04 $a 160 $2 23
100 1  $a Shieh, Sanford, $d 1962- $e author. $0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n00092159
245 10 $a Necessity lost : $b modality and logic in early analytic philosophy. $n Volume I / $c Sanford Shieh.
250    $a First edition.
264  1 $a Oxford, United Kingdom : $b Oxford University Press, $c [2019]
300    $a xxiv, 441 pages ; $c 24 cm
504    $a Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
520 8  $a A long tradition, going back to Aristotle, conceives of logic in terms of necessity and possibility: a deductive argument is correct if it is not possible for the conclusion to be false when the premises are true. A relatively unknown feature of the analytic tradition in philosophy is that, at its very inception, this venerable conception of the relation between logic and necessity and possibility - the concepts of modality - was put into question. The founders of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, held that these concepts are empty: there are no genuine distinctions among the necessary, the possible, and the actual. In this book, the first of two volumes, Sanford Shieh investigates the grounds of this position and its consequences for Frege's and Russell's conceptions of logic. The grounds lie in doctrines on truth, thought, and knowledge, as well as on the relation between mind and reality, that are central to the philosophies of Frege and Russell, and are of enduring philosophical interest. The upshot of this opposition to modality is that logic is fundamental, and, to be coherent, modal concepts would have to be reconstructed in logical terms. This rejection of modality in early analytic philosophy remains of contemporary significance, though the coherence of modal concepts is rarely questioned nowadays because it is generally assumed that suspicion of modality derives from logical positivism, which has not survived philosophical scrutiny. The anti-modal arguments of Frege and Russell, however, have nothing to do with positivism and remain a challenge to the contemporary acceptance of modal notions.
650  0 $a Logic. $0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85078106
650  0 $a Analysis (Philosophy) $0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85004780
650  7 $a Analysis (Philosophy) $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst00808323
650  7 $a Logic. $2 fast $0 (OCoLC)fst01002014
941    $a 1
952    $l OVUX522 $d 20191214013344.0
956    $a http://locator.silo.lib.ia.us/search.cgi?index_0=id&term_0=9A025B3C1E3F11EAA58222FC96128E48

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