"National Defense Research Institute." Includes bibliographical references (pages 87-89).
Contents:
References. Figures and Table -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Lesson 5. Introduction: A Short History of ALP -- Motivation for the Study -- Study Approach -- Organization of the Report -- Chapter 2. Cross-Cutting Obstacles: Obstacle 1: MOI Does Not Control Local Security Officials -- Obstacle 2: GIRoA May Lack Commitment to ALP -- Obstacle 3: Quick Reaction Force Support to ALP Is Uneven -- Obstacle 4: Coalition Reluctance to Shift Responsibility to MOI Deterred the Transition -- Obstacle 5: The Future of ALP Is Unclear -- Conclusion -- Chapter 3. Logistics: Push or Pull Logistics System -- Initial Equipment Issue -- Resupply Process -- Equipment and Resupply Results -- Other Logistics Functions -- Conclusion -- Chapter 4. Personnel Management: MOI Administrative Capacity -- ALP Recruiting, Vetting, and In-Processing -- ALP Pay and Benefits -- Conclusion - Chapter 5. Training: Training Location -- Regional Training Centers -- Trainers -- Training Curriculum -- Mobile Training Teams -- Conclusion -- Chapter 6. Recommendations for Future Local Security Programs: Lesson 1. Advisers Must Take Account of the Operating Environment and Work in Concert with Various Partners -- Lesson 2. Pull-Based Logistics Systems Often Take a Long Time to Evolve -- Lesson 3. Managing Dispersed Forces Requires a Balance Between Local Autonomy and Central Oversight -- Lesson 4. Centralized Training Has Advantages, but a Hybrid System May Work Best Over the Long Term -- Lesson 5. The Coalition Advisory Structure Should Be Maintained Until the Host Nation Has an Assured Sustainment Capability -- References.
Summary:
"RAND researchers assess the ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI) to support the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program; evaluate the range of logistics, personnel management, and training activities essential to the success of ALP's local security mission; and identify lessons from support to the program that might prove useful when undertaking similar efforts to help build local security forces in the future. This analysis relies primarily on interviews conducted in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2015 with Coalition and Afghan officials involved in the ALP program. To a lesser extent, the analysis draws on quantitative logistics and personnel reporting. While some MOI and Coalition initiatives have fared better than others and some are still a work in progress, our research shows some positive results -- in the form of recruits processed and vetted, equipment received, forces paid, and candidates trained -- with limited Coalition assistance since the end of 2014. However, examples of improved capabilities do not yet equate to an institutional commitment and capacity to sustain the ALP program. Still, for future U.S. government efforts to assist foreign partners in building the capacity of their local security forces, there are important insights that can be derived from the experience of transitioning ALP to full Afghan control"--Publisher's web site.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.