Includes bibliographical references (pages 249-288) and index.
Contents:
9. Index, p.291. PART I. CONTEXT, THEORY, EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK -- 1. Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses, p. XIII -- 2. The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents, p.3 -- PART II. INTRODUCING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS, p.28 -- 3. Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina, p.63 -- 4. Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Cornpliance in Mexico, p.88 -- 5. Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Ageney: From Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil, p.110 -- PART III. MODIFYING NEW PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT SYSTEMS -- 6. The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and Argentina's Market-Preserving Patent System, p.141 -- 7. What's Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexico's Internationalist Patent System, p.168 -- 8. Patent Policy in the Shadows of Over-Compliance: Neo-Developmentalism in Brazil, p.193 -- PART IV. CONCLUSION -- 9. Patents and Development in the New Global Economy, p.227 -- Fieldwork Appendix, p.247 -- References, p.249 -- Cited Interviews, p.289 -- Index, p.291.
Summary:
"Coalitions and Compliance examines how international changes can reconfigure domestic politics. Since the late 1980s, developing countries have been subject to intense pressures regarding intellectual property rights. These pressures have been exceptionally controversial in the area of pharmaceuticals. Historically, fearing the economic and social costs of providing private property rights over knowledge, developing countries did not allow drugs to be patented. Now they must do so, an obligation with significant implications for industrial development and public health. This book analyses different forms of compliance with this new imperative in Latin America, comparing the politics of pharmaceutical patenting in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Coalitions and Compliance focuses on two periods of patent politics: initial conflicts over how to introduce drug patents, and then subsequent conflicts over how these new patent systems function. In contrast to explanations of national policy choice based on external pressures, domestic institutions, or Presidents' ideological orientations, this book attributes cross-national and longitudinal variation to the ways that changing social structures constrain or enable political leaders' strategies to construct and sustain supportive coalitions. The analysis begins with assessment of the relative resources and capabilities of the transnational and national pharmaceutical sectors, and these rival actors' efforts to attract allies. Emphasis is placed on two ways that social structures are transformed so as to affect coalition-building possibilities: how exporters fearing the loss of preferential market access may be converted into allies of transnational drug firms, and differential patterns of adjustment among state and societal actors that are inspired by the introduction of new policies. It is within the changing structural conditions produced by these two processes that political leaders build coalitions in support of different forms of compliance." -- Provided by publisher.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.