Includes bibliographical references (pages 53-60).
Contents:
Monarchies, democracies, and indebtedness -- Political presuppositions and the theory of public finance -- Taxes as prices: A useful but corruptible simile -- From public pricing to fiscal policy: The Keynesian Detour -- Ecologies, not machines: Analytical failures of macro theories -- Calculation and coordination within a political economy -- Public debt, systemic lying, and the corruption of contract -- From liberal to feudal democracy: Henry Maine reversed -- Liberalism and collectivism: An easily toxic mix.
Summary:
"Economists commit a category mistake when they treat democratic governments as indebted. Monarchs can be indebted, as can individuals. In contrast, democracies can't truly be indebted. They are financial intermediaries that form a bridge between what are often willing borrowers and forced lenders. The language of public debt is an ideological language that promotes politically expressed desires and is not a scientific language that clarifies the practice of public finance. Economists have gone astray by assuming that a government is just another person whose impulses toward prudent action will restrict recourse to public debt and induce rational political action"--Publisher's website.
Series:
Cambridge elements. Elements in Austrian economics. 2514-3867
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