Securing gains in fragile states : using U.S. leverage in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond / Stephen Watts, Jeffrey Martini, Jason H. Campbell, Mark Toukan, Inhyok Kwon.
"Prepared for the United States Army." "RAND Arroyo Center." Includes bibliographical references (pages 339-365). See also RAND/RR-A250-2.
Summary:
The U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and the resulting U.S. military doctrine emphasize the need for the United States to consolidate the gains it has realized on the battlefield. Recognizing this need, however, is much easier than understanding the measures necessary to succeed. Both U.S. decisionmakers and a variety of analysts have generally agreed that broad-based, inclusive governance and institutionalized capacity-building consistent with the rule of law are the long-term goals for stabilizing fragile states. The conditions under which these goals are realistic and how to realize them are much more contentious. This report describes research intended to advance at least partial answers to these questions, including a framework to help better understand when we expect U.S. leverage to be successful in nudging partners toward better governance practices. While there is no panacea for the difficulties of stabilizing countries after conflicts, this research offers guidance on how the United States might improve the odds of securing such hard-won gains and evidence to suggest that-at least under the right circumstances-it can do so.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.