Rejecting compromise : legislators' fear of primary voters / Sarah E Anderson, University of California, Santa Barbara, Daniel M. Butler, University of California, San Diego, Laurel Harbridge-Yong, Northwestern University, Illinois.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 147-167) and index.
Contents:
Rejecting compromise, getting gridlock -- Legislators reject half-loaf compromises -- Legislators reject half-loaf compromises because they fear voter retribution -- Primary voters as the source of punishment -- Voter punishment is rare but real -- Structuring negotiations in the shadow of primary voter punishment -- Compromise, voter punishment in primaries, and legislative gridlock.
Summary:
"Congress has failed to make even incremental progress on a range of pressing problems in recent decades (Binder 2014), and many Americans are frustrated by the gridlock (Newport and Saad 2016). Scholars attribute gridlock to partisan polarization, which has made it harder for legislators to find common policy ground (Binder 2014; McCarty et al. 2006; Mann and Ornstein 2012; Shor and McCarty 2011). But even on issues where agreement is possible, legislators may reject compromise proposals that move policy only partway toward their preferred outcome. Voters recognize that this type of behavior contributes to gridlock. In a 2013 Pew survey, for example, 36 percent of Americans thought that the main reason for inaction in Congress was that "a few members who refuse to compromise keep things from getting done" (Pew 2013)"-- Provided by publisher.
This resource is supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Services under the provisions of the Library Services and Technology Act as administered by State Library of Iowa.